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Messy Creativity 
 
Rodney Jones 
University of Reading 
 
 "We need to make sure they understand the difference between a weapon and 
a tool. Language is messy, and sometimes, one can be both."  
 Dr. Louise Banks, Fictional Linguist in Arrival 
 
 In the science fiction movie Arrival (2016), linguist Louise Bank along with 
the rest of humanity find themselves in a bit of a mess. Twelve spacecraft 
containing aliens with messy amphibious bodies who speak an unintelligible 
language expressed through drawing stain-like circles in the air with black smoke 
have landed in twelve different countries on earth. Banks is charged with making 
sense of their language in order to discover why they have come. The biggest 
obstacle to this task, however, proves not to be the aliens, but the inherent 
messiness of language itself, with its maddening ambiguities and inconsistencies, 
as well as the messiness of human social systems that stand in the way of the 
different countries involved cooperating to solve the puzzle. In the end Banks 
learns that the task of understanding what the aliens want requires more than 
just linguistic analysis; it also requires intuition and premonition and no small 
amount of rule-breaking. 
 
The reason I begin with this reference to popular culture in considering the 
studies of linguistic creativity published in this special issue is that it aptly 
illustrates the main problem we encounter when we try to analyse linguistic 
creativity — the fact that both language and creativity are ultimately ‘messy’, and 
most of the tools we linguists have at our disposal are designed to detect orderly 
patterns rather than to confront messiness. As a result of this, many previous 
studies of linguistic creativity have focused more on the surface intricacies of 
creative language rather than the messy underbelly of contradictions, 
contingency, and indeterminacy that these papers attempt to confront. When I 
speak of the ‘messiness’ of linguistic creativity, it is not my intention to rehearse 
romantic notions of the creative artist as someone who is able to ‘create order 
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out of chaos' (which is, after all, more about ‘neatness’ than it is about 
‘messiness’), nor to explore more everyday observations about ‘creative people’ 
leading ‘messy lives’ (Roiphe, 2012) or having ‘messy desks’ (Vohs, 2013). Rather, I 
would like to highlight the aspects of ‘messy creativity’ that are apparent in the 
articles in this issue, the ‘noisy’, ‘dislocated’, even ‘unintelligible’ quality of some 
linguistic creativity, and the way it sometimes brings chaos out of order rather 
than the other way around. 
 
It might be that linguistic creativity has always been messy, but there is a real 
sense in this collection of essays that much of the creativity in these examples 
arises out of the cauldron of globalisation, inequality, conflict, and the dizzying 
developments in communication technologies which have brought about what 
Sommers (cited by Pratt) calls ‘invigorating combinations of beauty and fear, 
pleasure and unpleasure, certainty and risk, comprehension and 
incomprehension.’ It is a kind of creativity that shakes us out of our comfortable 
assumptions about the way applied linguistics ought to be carried out, and 
challenges us to develop 'messy' methods to confront this messy creativity, 
methods that go beyond trying to ‘make sense’ of it through traditional 
conceptual categories and attempt to approach it from the less traditional 
perspectives of embodiment and entanglement, affect and action. 
 
 
One messy thing about the linguistic creativity revealed in these papers is that it  
does not fit so easily into the categories we have developed to talk about either 
creativity or language. To say something is ‘creative’ is, above all, to make a value 
judgement, and the value we assign to something by calling it ‘creative’ is not 
just a judgement about its formal qualities or the relative skill it took to make it. 
It’s a judgement about its social worth, about its place within a particular moral 
universe. In the moral universe that dominates most Western conceptions of 
creativity, it is invariably associated with ideas like progress, invention, freedom 
and liberation, an ideological construction of creativity bequeathed to us partly 
from Enlightenment notions of the individual creative genius as the driver of 
human progress, and partly from Romantic notions of creativity as the path to 
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transcendence and spiritual fulfilment. That’s why it’s slightly jolting to encounter 
the sometimes regressive examples of creativity presented here. They are 
instances of creativity that are either too ‘nasty’ – like the ‘weaponised’ racist and 
homophobic language produced by the rappers that are the subject of Alim, Lee, 
Mason and Williams’s contribution or the scatological slurs of the schoolchildren 
analysed by Cekaite – too ‘noisy’ – like the ‘incomprehensible’ utterances 
described by Storch, which ‘hurl ruined order before our feet’ – or too ‘normal’ – 
like the buttoned down tweets about cricket and weather presented by Gillian, 
the ‘concentrated markers of conformity’ offered up by the undocumented 
immigrants analysed by Pratt, or the creatively ‘conventional’ language exhibited 
in the digital writing of South African university students analysed by Deumert. 
So the first thing that is ‘messy’ about these instances of creativity is that they 
‘mess with’ our ‘semiotic ideologies that construct certain actions as creative’ and 
our ‘social ideologies that project some contexts and actions as … extraordinary 
and noteworthy’ (Deumert this issue).  This is a creativity that is often neither 
progressive nor liberating, sometimes not even particularly ‘inventive’ in the usual 
sense of the world. It doesn’t bring ‘order out of chaos’; rather it rubs our faces 
in the contradictions of contemporary life and the inadequacy of our bourgeois, 
overly-intellectual ideas about what constitutes the ‘creative’.  
 
Another aspect of messiness apparent in these examples of linguistic creativity is 
the way they ‘mess with’ our traditional ideas about language, compelling us to 
engage with the ‘messy interpenetrations and switchings and embeddings and 
decouplings’ (White, 1992: 341) that have come to characterise the ‘messy 
linguistic marketplaces’ (Blommaert, 2010) of our fragmented yet interconnected 
world. Although linguists have long admitted to the messiness of language, their 
response has always seemed to be to develop tools and concepts to make that 
messiness seem neat. Even the words we use to describe hybridity, such as code 
mixing, and the more recent translanguaging, imply more or less orderly, 
deliberative processes. In the papers in the special issue, such words are replaced 
with messier, more transgressive terms like code-entanglement, script fusing, 
enmeshment and infiltration, metaphors which more accurately capture the messy 
interactions of codes and meanings which characterise many of the examples of 
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linguistic creativity represented here. Even more unsettling is the decoupling of 
code from meaning altogether that we see in the examples of ‘noisy creativity’ 
given by Storch, in which utterances derive their power not from meaning but 
from unintelligibility. But a stubborn refusal to cooperate with conventional ideas 
of syntax and semantics to some degree characterises almost all of the examples 
we see here. As Deumert puts it, ‘in engaging with language creatively, speakers 
and writers regularly go beyond the symbolic, the conventional and the 
referential,’ and so, as analysts, we must be willing to do so as well, seeking out 
ways to ‘explore signs as invested with emotion and affect, not simply describing 
the world, but also expressing our relation to it.’ 
 
Taken as a whole, then, what the papers in this issue argue for is the 
development of a new set of 'messy methods' for understanding linguistic 
creativity, ways of looking at linguistic creativity that move our attention away 
from abstract words produced in abstract spaces to an understanding of 
creativity as a matter of messy assemblages of language, bodies, intentions, 
emotions, rules, and transgressions. 
In his book, After Method: Mess in Social Science Research, the sociologist John 
Law (2004:2) argues that ‘when social science tries to describe things that are 
complex, diffuse and messy … it tends to make a mess of it.’ He offers four 
possibilities for the development of methods for 'knowing mess' which, 
interestingly, articulate with the very orientations suggested by the authors of 
these papers: 1) knowing as embodiment, 2) knowing as emotionality or 
apprehension (or, as the authors in these pages put it, knowing as affect and 
aesthetics), 3) knowing through techniques of deliberate imprecision, and 4) 
knowing through situated inquiry. All of these forms of knowing, he points out, 
involve a kind of ‘re-knowing’ of ourselves as scholars, and a rethinking of ‘our 
relations with whatever it is we know, and … how far the process of knowing it 
also brings it into being’ (Law 2004:3).  
 
One thing that makes these studies of linguistic creativity unique is the extent to 
which the authors focus their attention on the ways linguistic creativity is 
embodied.  Most of the work on linguistic creativity to date has, not surprisingly, 
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focused primarily on language, without sufficient attention to the bodies that 
produce it and the bodies that hear it. In many of the contributions in this issue, 
however, the embodied nature of linguistic creativity is front and centre. An 
important aspect of the verbal duels described by Alim, Lee, Masin and Williams , 
for example, is the way performers make use of ‘gestures, facial expressions, and 
bodily comportment’ as semiotic weapons. Similarly, Cekaite observes how the 
everyday linguistic play of children cannot be understood through the analysis of 
language alone, but also requires attention to ‘embodied actions, gestures, gaze, 
laughter, smiles, and repetitions, configured within embodied participation 
frameworks.’ Even the disembodied digitally mediated performances described by 
Gillian and Deumert call attention to the body through its absence or, more 
accurately, its displacement (see below). Bodies can serve as carriers of loneliness, 
rage, despair, and ecstasy in ways that language never can. Bodies can at one 
moment be the source of intelligible speech, and at the next moment be the 
source of noise and confusion. They can prop up what we say, or contradict it, as 
in the anecdote in Pratt's paper about the street corner altercation in which 
participants say one thing and do another. But verbal creativity does not just 
emanate from ‘messy bodies’; it also creates them, in the form of the overtly 
racialized figures of Alim, Lee, Mason and Williams’s rappers, whose bodily 
features are used  as weapons against them, or in the feminized male body 
described by the term ‘hole of your father’, which, as Storch argues, does not just 
invoke an ‘unwanted and dangerous’ body, but also disrupts the patriarchal order 
of the social body. The performance and representation of bodies in discourse is 
always about more than constructing physical forms; it is about, as Alim, Lee, 
Mason and Williams remind us, creating, maintaining, or subverting social 
categories such as those of gender, race, ethnicity, class and national origin. In 
other words, we use the body as a creative resource, and at the same time create 
(and destroy) those very same bodies in our social interaction.  
 
Another messy method that these authors experiment with involves confronting 
the affective dimension of linguistic creativity, which to some degree aligns them 
with the larger 'affective turn' that scholars in other social sciences are currently 
navigating (see for example Clough 2010, Massumi 2002). In doing this, to some 
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degree they find themselves on familiar ground when it comes to language 
studies, engaging with what Pratt refers to as the poetic aspects of language, 
including musicality, dissonance, voice, rhythm, and register. Attention to such 
aspects of language, Pratt argues, exposes us not just to the affective dimensions 
of language, but also its political dimensions. ‘Linguistic exchanges,’ she writes 
‘are saturated by the micropolitics of style [in which] variation can be a quickstep 
or a duel, a choreography of risk across whatever social map is in play’, a 
characterisation that as aptly describes the verbal battles reported by Alim, Lee, 
Mason and Williams as it does the more conventional tweets and texts reported 
by Gillen and Deumert.  
 
But there are also aspects of the affective turn that put linguists like the scholars 
represented in this issue on relatively unfamiliar ground. After all, in other social 
sciences the affective turn has been seen as a reaction to, and somewhat of a 
rejection of, the linguistic turn that has dominated the social sciences since the 
1970s, a way of ‘toppling from a privileged position … linguistic-based structures 
of meaning making’ (Clough 20:2). For many social scientists who have taken this 
turn, as Wetherell (2013: 349) points out, ‘affect is contrasted with the discursive 
and the cognitive', representing an emphasis on ‘processes beyond, below and 
past discourse’ (350, emphasis mine). How far is it possible, then, to conceive of 
an affective turn in linguistics? How far is it possible for work on affect in 
language to go beyond the very competent but altogether ‘neat’ analysis of the 
linguistic expression of emotion (see for example Dewaele 2010) to embrace the 
messiness of affect as a method, and how could such a turn contribute to our 
understanding of the relationship between language and creativity? 
 
The answer is, to some extent, already articulated in much of the literature on 
affect theory, that is, to understand affect not through the lens of emotion but, 
as Deumert (this issue) does, through the lens of action and agency, things that 
applied linguists and discourse analysts do know quite a lot about (for overview 
see Jones & Norris 2005). For Spinoza, the patron saint of affect theory, affect is 
not just about our emotional responses to people, objects, environments, or to 
the representations we form of them based on our experiences, but rather with 
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movement towards a greater capacity for action (Spinoza 1985, see also Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987). According to Clough (2007:2), ‘affect refers … to bodily 
capacities to affect and be affected and the augmentation or diminution of a 
body’s capacity to engage, and to connect.’ In this regard, it is linked to ‘the self-
feeling of being alive — that is, aliveness or vitality.’ This orientation towards 
action and connection is reflected in all of the papers in this issue, and especially 
captured by Pratt in the list of questions she asks scholars of language and 
creativity to ask themselves: 
 
What gives utterances the ability to generate courage? To move people 
from one belief to another, to compel action? How does speech emancipate 
and generate new futures? What qualities give speech the world-making, 
subject-producing, transformative powers we see exhibited every day?  
 
What affect theory particularly adds to our understanding of social action and 
agency is the recognition that the capacity to affect and be affected can never be 
located in the social actor alone: it is always a matter of complex entanglements 
of actors and objects and environments and their representations. As Barad 
(2007:139) puts it, phenomena are ‘the ontological entanglement of intra-acting 
agencies.’ The main beef that Barad and other affect theorists have with 
linguistics, as well as with other approaches which they might classify as 
‘representational’, is their tendency to want to separate out these entities, to treat 
bodies and objects and language as if they can be analyzed separately from one 
another. This, however, is not a charge that can be levied at the authors of these 
papers, who demonstrate quite clearly that it is indeed possible to marshal tools 
from discourse analysis to produce ‘textured, lively analyses of multiple modes of 
engagement … [which] understand the working of power through patterns of 
assemblage’ (Wetherell 2013: 349, emphasis mine). While our traditional 
(Western) ways of thinking about action and agency tend to construct distinct 
entities such as 'subject' and 'object', 'speaker' and 'hearer', 'creator' and 
'creation', what the authors of these studies highlight is that these constructions 
do not work very well when we are confronted with the messy, entangled nature 
of much linguistic creativity. They reveal what Cekaite, quoting Ingold & Hallam 
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(2007: 20), refers to as ‘the limitations of “conceptualizing creativity as a form of 
invention, exercised by an autonomous individual”’, or even as a form of 
collaboration by separate agentive entities. Agency in creativity, as evidenced in 
these papers, is distributed in ‘messy’ ways among the different performers 
involved, among performers and audiences, and among humans and the tools 
that they use to create, whether they be physical objects, built environments, 
digital platforms, or symbolic systems like language, gestures, or clothing. Like 
affect scholars, they remind us that linguistic creativity arises not from individuals, 
but from assemblages of 'diverse materials, including language structure, prosody 
and visible displays, [and] human action' (Cekaite, this issue). It occurs in the 
context of polylogic participation frameworks in which different human and 
nonhuman agents constantly shift positions and roles. In fact, the creativity of 
many of the linguistic productions described in these articles is as dependent on 
the ways they are listened to, perceived, and responded to, as they are on the 
way they are produced. Moreover, many of these responses refuse to fit into the 
conventional patterns of joint 'sense making' that discourse analysts are fond of; 
they are sometimes more competitive then cooperative, aimed more at scuttling 
sense making than supporting it. Under the circumstances, the whole notion of 
what it means to be a performer becomes decentered, by social actors who, in 
the words of Alim, Lee, Mason and Williams, both perform and are performed 
into certain kinds of bodies and certain kinds of social identities with different 
kinds of capacities to affect and be affected. 
 
The third of Law’s examples of messy methods that the authors of these articles 
embrace is what he calls 'deliberate imprecision', which manifests in a less 
semantic and more metaphorical approach to meaning. This is perhaps best 
exemplified in the embrace of the notion of indexicality (see in particular the 
papers by Deumert and Storch), a concept that has migrated to linguistics from 
semiotics and which seeks to capture the way meanings shift and change as 
language interacts with contexts and experiences, beliefs and prejudices, and all 
of the other messy aspects of human social life. Although much of the work on 
indexicality in sociolinguistics in the past decade has been devoted to 
understanding how indexical meaning becomes progressively 'solid' or 
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'enregistered' in particular communities, other work has highlighted the 
essentially fragile, and 'messy' nature of indexical meaning (see for example Jones 
2013, Joseph 2013, Johnstone and Kiesling 2008), the fact that the concept of 
indexicality is often better suited to revealing the fundamental indeterminacy of 
relations between forms and meanings than to resolving it. In fact, following the 
trails of indexicality formed by some of the examples in these papers reminds 
one a bit of the parable that Perry (1979) tells as a warning against essentialising 
indexicals of the messy shopper who follows a trail of sugar through the aisles of 
the supermarket, trying to catch whoever it is that is making the mess, only to 
discover that he is the shopper that he is trying to catch. The solution to this 
dilemma offered by the authors of these papers is not to avoid imprecision but 
to deliberately traffic in it, to admit that indexical meaning is at its heart the 
product of metaphorical (or even, as Storch argues, magical) thinking, a way of 
going beyond the representational or conventionally pragmatic dimensions of 
language use to explore its essentially ‘slippery, indistinct, elusive, complex, 
diffuse, messy, textured, vague, unspecific, confused, disordered, emotional, 
painful, pleasurable, hopeful, horrific, lost, redeemed, visionary, angelic, demonic, 
mundane, intuitive, sliding, and unpredictable' nature (Law 2004:6). In doing so 
they are answering Johnstone and Kiesling's (2008:29) call for a more 
'phenomenological approach to … social meaning … that pays particular attention 
to the multiplicity and indeterminacy of indexical relations and to the way in 
which such relations arise in lived experience.' 
 
Attention to the more experiential dimension of linguistic creativity naturally 
entails Law's fourth messy method, knowing through situated inquiry. Nearly all 
of the papers in this issue champion the importance of understanding linguistic 
creativity as a situated phenomenon, embedded in particular irreducible and 
unrepeatable moments of social action (Scollon 2001), and their commitment to 
this perspective is reflected in the methods they adopt for gathering and 
interrogating data (as well as their ideas about what counts as linguistic data in 
the first place). The ethnographic approaches adopted by these authors provide 
insights into the ways opportunities for creative language use are contingent not 
just on the immediate social context but also on the broader political context, 
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and into the ways linguistic creativity does not just arise out of particular social 
contexts but plays a role in creating and transforming them. 
 
One of the most striking things about these studies is the way they highlight not 
just the fact that creative language is always situated, but also the fact that it 
often functions in ways that mess up these situations and disturb the footing of 
the people in them. Like the mysterious beings in the movie Arrival, the linguistic 
creativity described in these pages often seems alien, ‘out of place’, inserted into 
contexts where it is not supposed to be. This, after all, is, as Mary Douglas 
(1966/2002) has argued, the very definition of ‘a mess’. The ‘out of placeness’ 
illustrated in these papers includes both ‘out of place’ people — such as the 
undocumented immigrants in Pratt’s article who claim legitimacy by inserting 
themselves into the most ‘normal’ of contexts, and the tribal ‘outcasts’ described 
by Storch— and out of place language — such as the ‘emplacement’ of 
unconventional versions of Arabic in public spaces described by Panović , or the 
‘out of placeness’ of the language of the former colonisers in ‘decolonial’ 
contexts described by Deumert, and even the displacement of language from its 
physical context through the affordances of electronic media described by Gillen. 
In all of these papers, in fact, situated creativity arises within ‘messy’ situations of 
instability, what Pratt in this issue (see also 1991) calls ‘contact zones’, or what 
Deumert, quoting Fanon (1963) calls zones of ‘occult instability’, places that 
sometimes exist, as do the discursive spaces created by the verbal duels 
described by Alim, Lee, Mason and Williams, at the risky edge of insult, rupture 
or violence. At the same time, the linguistic creativity described in these papers is 
also sometimes difficult for us as scholars to locate or ‘situate’. It is never 'just 
there' for us to analyze, but rather always emergent, contingent, dislocated and 
improvisational, both playing off and playing with the 'ethics, desires, spaces, 
manners, meanings, and the assumptions of mutual responsibility' (Pratt this 
issue) that arise in the moments of their production. If, as Storch (citing Holquist 
2014:18) reminds us, a central concept of Bakhtin’s metalinguistics ‘grows out of 
his conception of human beings as persons who share the task of being 
responsible for their own situatedness in a particular time and place’ – part of 
being creative users of language — and effective scholars of linguistic creativity 
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— is being responsive to the fact that the whole idea of situatedness is itself 
often disruptive, disturbing, or just plain ‘messy’. 
 
In a recent article in the Guardian, Indian author Pankaj Mishra (2016) writes: ‘The 
stunning events of our age of anger, and our perplexity before them, make it 
imperative that we anchor thought in the sphere of emotions; these upheavals 
demand nothing less than a radically enlarged understanding of what it means for 
human beings to pursue the contradictory ideals of freedom, equality and prosperity.’ 
What the scholars in this issue suggest is that one way to do this is to train our 
analytical attention onto the everyday moments of linguistic creativity through which 
these ideals of freedom, equality, and prosperity are worked out, and then to train 
our gaze back to our precarious positions as analysts, who, like the aliens (and the 
linguists) in Arrival must operate with our feet planted simultaneously on solid ground 
and dangling in the murky deep. 
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